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Criminal-hacker nexus leads to a 2 step target selection process, which begins with a short list of firms with similar 
information assets from which the hacker finally picks up that firm which has the weakest defense. This translates into a 
scenario where firms with similar information assets engage in a veiled race so as not to appear as the soft target in the focus 
group. In this work we propose a duopolistic model and utilize a differential game framework to analyze the IT security 
investment decisions of two firms who find themselves in such a short list of hacking targets and must compete dynamically 
on their IT security investments to reduce the risk of being breached. We provide the steady state (singular region) analysis of 
the differential game for two firms with symmetric and asymmetric parameters. Our model exhibits that hacker learning and 
firms’ security investment efficiency have opposite effects on the two equilibrium outcomes of interest, namely, the security 
level and the security investment rate. As hacker learning improves (security investment efficiency increases), the security 
levels and security investment rate of the two firms move apart (closer). 
Keywords  
IT Security, IT Security Investment, Control Theoretic Approach, Optimal Control in IT Security  
1. INTRODUCTION  
Profitable association with criminals has quite transformed hacker motivation to attack unauthorized computers. Motivations 
like gaining swaggering rights, exhibiting technical skills and enjoying playful thrills have given way to purely criminal, 
gain-seeking behavior as dictated by the criminals, who now engage hackers for stealing information assets of value. Also, 
severe commoditization of Credit and Debit Card numbers, in terms of open availability and high volume of supply in the 
black market, have driven prices so low that cyber criminals have now been compelled to revise their game plans. Single 
sign-on login credentials for organizations (e.g. Citrix log-in access based on SSO) and FTP accounts now-a-days fetch 
premium prices; healthcare related information as well as email exchanges are now traded for high gains1. Another popular 
hacking target in the face of the current downturn in the global economy is intellectual property; stealing proprietary 
marketable information assets is cheaper than creating them through painstaking initiatives in innovation2.  
We pose this interesting question at this point: ‘Given that hackers now work for the criminals, how does this nuance the 
security landscape in which a firm must defend its IT assets?’ Unfortunately, there is no straightforward answer to this 
question, and there are no obvious insights available from the extant research in IT security. In order to explain such nuanced 
IT defense, we argue that the intent and the modus operandi of hacking activities need to be explained from 2 angles: first 
from the perspective of the principals of the hacking attacks, namely the criminals, and then from that of their agents, i.e., the 
hackers. Consider a criminal intending to steal the Citrix SSO log-in access of a medical practice into a large healthcare 
provider network/repository:  
(a) The malevolent intent of a criminal in cyber crime stems from his/her downstream contacts and accomplices to utilize the 
derived information to buy/sell illegal drugs or set up fake web-based drug stores. (Similarly, a stolen SSO access to the 
Outlook express of an equity research analyst is a prized possession to criminals having skills in pump and dump schemes, 
because they can now utilize the Outlook access to analyze the exchanges of the official e-mails of that stock analyst.) As a 
result, the malevolent intent of the criminals, in view of their strengths in downstream activities, segregates defending firms 
into disparate target groups of firms who possess similar information assets. The development of such target groups of firms 
is also supported by a large section of the IT security practitioners in the US: about a fifth of those respondents who suffered 
one or more kinds of security incidents confirmed that they had suffered a targeted attack aimed exclusively at their 
organization, or organizations within a small subset of the general population (CSI survey 2007). In mid-July 2007, The 
                                                          
1 Malicious page of The Month, (May 2008). Fijian Malicious Code Research Center,(http://www.finjan.com/Content.aspx?id=1367) 
2 Ackerman et. al. (2009). Unsecured Economies, Protecting Vital Information. McAfee Report. 
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Washington Post reported attacks on the computers belonging to the U.S. federal government, contractors and companies in 
the transportation industry. A report from Message Labs also suggests that narrowly targeted attacks are becoming more 
popular (www.DarkReading.com April 18, 2007).   
(b) Criminals employ hackers to gain the access to the information asset. For our examples in point-1 above, the skills that 
the criminal would look for in a hacker are in terms of penetrating fortified network perimeters and hijacking ports, including 
gaining FTP accesses. However, hackers tend to compromise/access the specified information asset by spending the lowest 
amount of effort in order to maximize his/her return. This incentivizes a hacker to further select a soft target in the first set of 
target victims which was separated by the criminal’s intent (point-1 above). Hackers achieve this intermediate goal by 
scoping their potential victims’ defense systems through footprinting, fingerprinting, information enumeration and dry runs.  
In view of (1) and (2) above, certain considerations tend to emerge for the defender of a cyber attack. First, a firm needs to 
assess its information assets in terms of their unauthorized sale/use, and then ascertain the group of firms from where a 
potential hacker could access such similar assets. For example, an inherent security issue for both Facebook and MySpace is 
the presence of third-party applications (http://www.eweek.com, Dec17, 2008). Second, having identified the target group 
that it belongs to, a firm needs to competitively invest in IT security such that it can offer relatively higher resistance to a 
hacker than a comparable firm, in order not to appear as the soft target in the group of similar firms. In other words, a firm 
needs to harden its IT security only enough to deter and divert a potential abuser, who would then gravitate to a softer target 
that may require relatively less effort to compromise. That relative strength in defense can divert hackers to the less 
prepared/secured firm is evidenced in reality. In a sample of 18 financial firms, a 2004 study by the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) of UK found that hackers routinely preferred smaller financial firms who also exhibited lower levels of 
security investments/preparedness.  
Finally, as a result of the above shift in attack dynamics, firms with similar information assets (from the criminal’s 
perspective) are now likely to find themselves as competing targets for hackers. In this work, we analyze the investment 
strategies of such similar firms in their endeavor not to appear as the soft target of a hence identified target group. In 
particular, here we propose a duopolistic model of competing IT security investment between two firms in the same target 
group. Our adoption of a stylized duopoly model brings out managerial insights that are important, relevant and timely, but 
keeps our analytics tractable. We choose a control theoretic approach for our analysis because of our intention to analyze the 
relative investments of the firms on a continuous time profile.  
The contribution of this work is two-fold. We provide a model for the nuanced IT security defense in view of the established 
fact that hacking activities are quite criminalized today. This helps us analyze the implicit competition among similar firms’ 
IT security investments facing a scheming hacker. Secondly, we analyze such competition in IT defense within a framework 
of differential game, and utilize control theoretic approach in the continuous time. To the best of our knowledge, none of this 
has been done before. Significantly, our work brings out the facts that hacker learning and IT investment efficiency play 
major roles in the way they determine the level of comparative investment in firms’ IT security investment: we exhibit a 
dilution effect on the investment of the firms as investment efficiency increases as well as a spreading out effect on firms’ 
investment as hacker learning increases because of the experiential gains of the hacker from the scoping and hacking 
activities.  
In what follows, we briefly review the relevant literature in Section 2, present the notation and the analysis of our model in 
Section 3, and provide our concluding remarks in Section 4. This is a research in progress where we plan to analyze a central 
planners’ solution and compare the investment levels of the firms between the regimes of parochial and coordinated IT 
security investment.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Our current work relates to the interdependence of IT security investment among target firms, and here we provide a brief 
review of the closely related literature. Research in the economics of information systems literature address investments in IT 
security. Gordon and Loeb (2002) analyze how security vulnerabilities moderate firms’ IT security investments, which 
Tanaka et. al. (2005) empirically corroborates. Varian (2002) identifies existence of free riding behavior in firms where he 
views IT security in the light of public good being provisioned by private entities. Kunreuther and Heal (2003) analyze this 
interdependence of firms’ IT security, and characterize the free riding behavior. Hausken (2006) analyzes IT security 
investment as impacted by firms’ interdependence, income, and substitution effects; and later (Hausken (2007)), 
substitutability and complementarities of IT security investments. Ogut et al. (2005) differentiate security investments 
between technological controls and cyber insurance instruments and show general complementarity between these 
instruments. Bohme et. al. (2006) show that correlated cyber risks may create deficiencies in the supply of suitable 
cyberinsurance instruments, while Bandyopadhyay et. al. (2009) argue that IT managers face implicit losses leading to 
perceived contract overpricing in the demand side of cyberinsurance products. Sharing of Information about IT 
security/breaches have also been studied to analyze interdependent IT security investments: Gordon, Loeb, and Lucyshyn 
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(2003) show that sharing security information reduce firm’s incentives to invest in IT security, while Gal-Or and Ghose 
(2005) argue that IT security investments and information sharing could also feature as strategic complements. The study of 
differential games was initiated by Isaacs (1965) with applications to warfare and pursuit-evasion problems. A control 
theoretic approach to solve differential games has been utilized in several works (Sethi et. al 2000), Dockner et. al (2000) yet 
remained limited to advertising and military games to investigate simultaneous Nash equilibria, and later to investigate 
Stackelberg equilibria in Supply Chain scenarios.  
3. THE MODEL AND ANALYSIS 
The differential game in our model is set up in the backdrop of duopolistic competition between Firms A and B in their bid 
not to appear as the preferred target for an attacking hacker. Each of these firms possesses similar information assets which is 
the subject of interest to a criminal. In order to compromise the information asset, the criminal engages a hacker, who in turn 
attempts to optimize her own efforts during the process of compromising the above information asset. In the following 
paragraphs we first present our assumptions and notation, before we present the objective function that the players attempt to 
minimize. Next, we present the Hamiltonians, propose the non-singular solutions, and discuss their analytical tractability for 
singular solutions. Finally we present the singular solutions of our model first under further assumption of symmetry between 
the firms (analytical), and then we relax this specific assumption of symmetry and present a numerical analysis.   
3.1 Assumptions and Model 
Firstly, we assume that firms A and B are substitutable to each other from the hackers’ point of view, and that the hacker has 
the capability to assess the vulnerability level of the firms utilizing standard scoping activities, including those of foot and 
finger printing tactics over the Internet. In other words, after scoping activities, the hacker can compare the relative 
vulnerability levels of the firms, and channel more hacking attempts toward the softer target. We present below the notation 
used in our model and analysis. 
xA  (xB): The vulnerability level of firm A (B). This is defined as the probability of breach given 
an attack by the hacker.  State Variables   
)(tN  The aggregate attacking traffic at time t 
LA (LB) Loss suffered firm by firm A (B) from a realized breach 
SA(t) (SB(t)) The rate of IT security investment by firm A (B).  Control Variables 
maxS  The maximum rate of IT security investment by either firm A (B) 
Aλ ( Bλ ) The current value adjoint (shadow) variable 
r The discount rate, assumed same for either firm A (B) 
Aβ )( Bβ  The investment efficiency parameter of firm A (B) 
ρ The time rate of increase in vulnerability of a firm as a reflection of the Hackers’ 
learning effect,  assumed same for either firm A (B) 
Table 1: Notation Used in Our Analysis  
Secondly, we assume that the proportion of hacking attempts targeted at firm A and B at any instant as 
which preserves the aggregate hacking rate and the relative 
impact of the vulnerability levels of the firms. A firm’s security level depends on the security investment of that firm, 
vulnerability levels xA(t) and xB(t) are functions of SA(t) and SB(t). Consequently, the state equations are





                                          ,                                 (1) ρβ +−=
•
AAAA xtSx )( axA =)0(
                                                           (2) BBBB B
Thirdly, we assume that firm A (B)’s losses due to penetration/breach is an increasing function of the amount of attacking 
attempts on the firm A (B). Lastly, the discount rate r captures the current value of summated investments for a firm in our 
infinite-horizon model. Firm A’s objective is to minimize the losses from breach through IT security investment, and thus 




                                                          
3 a and b are the initial vulnerability level of firms A and B respectively. 
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expected loss of firm A from one attacking attempt, and  is the amount of attacking traffic at firm A. 
Firms A and B’s objective functions can be rewritten as  





                             







                                                   







3.2 General Analysis 
Firstly, the current-value Hamiltonians for these firms, based on the state equations (1) and (2), and the objective functions 
(3) and (4), can be written as  
AABAA
BBABB xxxxH ))1)(2/1(




                         (5)  
−+−= λβρλ +−+                         (6) B
Where Aλ and Bλ are the current-value adjoint variables for firms A and B respectively. 
From (5) and (6), the Hamiltonians are linear in the control variables (SA and SB), and we have the following bang-bang4 and 
singular solution form for SA and SB. 
 0     if  0)1( +− AAA x <λβ  
SA: To be Determined  if 0) =+ AAA x1(− λβ  
 Smax                   if 0)1( >+− AAA xλβ  
   0 if  0)1( +− BBB xλ <β  
SB: To be Determined  if 0)1 =( +− BBB xλβ  
  Smax if 0)1( >+− BBB xλβ  
The controls in the singular region are required to satisfy the following conditions (7). 




  and   ,  i = A, B                                          (7) 
ii SiSi
Aλ BλAs for the current-value adjoint variables and , we also have the following equations.  









                                 (8) 
2/// BBBBABBBBBBB SLLrxHrdtd λβλλλ −−=∂∂−=                                    (9) 
Solving equations (7) - (9) and (1) - (2), we have  
0/2/2 =−−+− xxxLxLr ρββ                                    (10) 
0/2/2 =−−+− BBABBBBB xxxLxLr ρββ                                     (11) 
where and , the singular levels of firms’ vulnerability, are the solutions of the above two equations. Since (10) and 




3.3 Symmetric Firms 
=The symmetric case assumes equality between corresponding parameters of the two firms. When = and 
, we have , which is a solution of . From (1) and (2), both and are 
positive constants, thus in the singular period, ,  i.e., both firms make identical and constant rate of 
security investment in the singular region.  In the pre-singular region, for firm A, if (i) , (i.e., the initial vulnerability 
level is higher than that in the singular level), then 
βββ == BA
∧∧∧
== xxx BA xrLx /2/2 ρβ +=
∧ ∧
∧∧∧








maxSS A = , (ii) if , then ; and (iii) if , then 
. The pre-singular region solutions for firm B can be derived in a similar fashion. Also, in the symmetric case,
/
∧




























4 Discreet controls at either Maximum controlling force or Complete absence of any controlling force, no intermediate levels are optimal. 
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Proposition 1:  
o firms are symmetric, then they both make the same constant rate of security investment in the singular 
ion 2:  
erability level of each firm increases if 1) the Loss from a Breach decreases, 2) the security investment 
 increases if 1) the Loss from a Breach increases, 2) the 
 we conduct numerical analysis due to the difficulty of obtaining analytical results. The baseline 




efficiency decreases, or 3) the hackers’ learning effect increases.  
 The singular level of security investment rate of each firm
security investment efficiency decreases, or 3) the hackers’ learning effect increases.  
3.4 Asymmetric Firms 
In the asymmetric case,
values of the model parameters as assumed are ,1=Aβ  ,2=Bβ 100=AL , 300=BL , 6.0=ρ , and 1.0=r .  
3.2.1 Impact of Security Investment Efficien S bs the ba vacy on ecurity: In this su ection, we choose seline lues for all the 
parameters except for β. Here we take βββ == BA , and vary the value of β from 0.1 to 10.  Consistent with our results for 
the symmetric case, each firm’s vulnera oes down as security investment efficiency improves (Figure 1). Firm B, 
which has a higher loss of a breach (i.e., AB LL > ), has a lower vulnerability level in the singular region.  
bility level g
  
Figure 1: The Impact of Investment Efficiency (β)   
 

















































Security Investment Efficiency 
Sa
Sb
on the Vulnerability Levels of Firms     on the Security Investment Rates of Firms 
The differen  the two firms (i.e.,
∧
ent ce between the vulnerabilities of
∧
) goes down as well, as the security investmBA xx −
curity inefficiency improves. This indicates that an improvement in the se vestment efficiency may dilute the difference of 
firms’ vulnerability in the singular region, suggesting a relatively more balanced attacking traffic, since the amount of 
attacking traffic is a function of the difference of the two firms’ vulnerability levels. Similarly, the improvement of the 
security investment efficiency also dilutes the difference of firms’ security investment rates in the singular region (Figure 2).  
 
3.2.2 Impact of Hackers’ Learning Effect on Security: In this subsection, we choose the baseline values for all the model 
 
parameters except for ρ, which we vary from 0.1 to 1.  
 
Figure 3: The Impact of  Hackers’ Learning Effect (ρ) 
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Vulnerability and Information Security Investment: an Empirical 
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both firms’ vulnerability lev e as hacker’s learning effect increases (Figure 3), which is aga nt with our 
findings in the symmetric case. Note that the firm with the lower value of Efficiency-Loss parameter is more insecure. 
Interestingly, the gap between the vulnerability levels of these two firms increases with Hackers’ leaning. This happens 
because the firm with higher value of Efficiency-Loss parameter tends to secure its systems more effectively, and thus is less 
sensitive to hackers’ learning effect. This ‘spreading-out’ effect in the gap of firms’ vulnerability levels result in a higher 
proportion of attacking traffic target the firm with a lower Efficiency-Loss. We also observe a similar ‘spreading-out’ effect 
in Figure 4, where the gap between the security investment rates of these two firms increases as hackers’ learning effect 
increases. Also note that, the firm with lower Efficiency-Loss parameter has a higher security investment rate (Figure 4), a 
result that reflects that the security investment efficiency chosen for that firm is relatively lower. 
 
, },{ BAi =
4
We have employed a differentia
compete dynamically on IT security investments to reduce the risk of being breached. We have shown analytically how the 
firms’ security levels and investment rates change with model parameters in the case where two firms are symmetric. In the 
asymmetric case, we have shown that hacker learning and the security investment efficiency have a spreading-out effect and 
a diluting effect, respectively, on the security levels and security investment rates of the two firms. The analysis of our model 
provides guideline for managers to strategically plan their security investment rates at a particular time and estimate their 
security levels effectively in a relative sense that occurs in a dynamic, competitive environment of the modern business. 
There are several interesting issues that are worth studying in the future research. For instance, we propose to study the 
optimal security investment paths from a central planer’s perspective, compare IT security investments under individual and 
coordinated decision regimes and also identify an effective coordination scheme for the two firms when the social solution 
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